[Including but not Limited to] Violence Against Women by Shay, Giovanna
Western New England University School of Law
Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications
2013
[Including but not Limited to] Violence Against
Women
Giovanna Shay
Western New England University School of Law, gshay@law.wne.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Giovanna Shay, [Including but not Limited to] Violence Against Women, 42 SW L. REV. 801 (2013).
5.SHAY.ARTICLE.MACRO.6.6.13 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/20/2013 12:37 PM 
 
801 
 
[INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO] 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
 
Giovanna Shay* 
In recent years, commentators have paid increasing attention to male 
sexual victimization and same-sex intimate partner violence.  Law professor 
Bennett Capers has published an article entitled Real Rape Too, focusing on 
male rape;
1
 human rights activists have written about how the human rights 
community has tended to equate gender violence with violence against 
women;
2
 and the national media has reported on the experiences of male 
rape victims.
3
  At the same time, the LGBTQ rights movement has called 
for more awareness regarding intimate partner violence in same-sex 
relationships.
4
 
In this symposium piece, I want to reflect on our current moment of 
transition to more gender-inclusive notions of sexual and intimate partner 
violence.  I’m going to highlight three developments in 2012 that 
represented that movement: the FBI’s adoption of a gender-neutral 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.  Thanks to Kelly 
Strader and the Southwestern Law Review for the invitation to participate in this symposium; to 
Kelly, Kim S. Buchanan, Erin Buzuvis, Bennett Capers, Jennifer Levi, and Sudha Setty for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts; and to James Ackley, Elliott Hibbler, and Pat Newcombe for fine 
research assistance. 
 1.  Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (2011). 
 2.  Lara Stemple, Male Rape and Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 605-606 (2009). 
 3.  Roni Caryn Rabin, Men Struggle for Rape Awareness, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/health/as-victims-men-struggle-for-rape-
awareness.html. 
 4.  NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, 
TRANSGENDER, QUEER AND HIV-AFFECTED INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2011), available at  
http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/Reports/2012_NCAVP_2011_IPV_Report.pdf.  See also 
Tara R. Pfeifer, Out of the Shadows: The Positive Impact of Lawrence v. Texas on Victims of 
Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1251, 1252-1253 (2005); Krisana M. 
Hodges, Trouble in Paradise: Barriers to Addressing Domestic Violence in Lesbian Relationships, 
9 L. & SEXUALITY 311, 312-313 (1999-2000).  See also Tara R. Pfeifer, Out of the Shadows: The 
Positive Impact of Lawrence v. Texas on Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 109 PENN. ST. 
L. REV. 1251, 1252-1253 (2005). 
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definition of rape; the debate regarding the reauthorization of the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA); and the promulgation of new Department of 
Justice (DOJ) regulations under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 
(PREA). 
The first important development that I want to consider occurred early 
in 2012, when the FBI changed its definition of rape to include male 
victims.
5
  Until 2012, the FBI definition tracked the traditional definition of 
rape, and was gendered: it criminalized “carnal knowledge of a female 
forcibly and against her will.”
6
  The vast majority of American jurisdictions 
have adopted rape statutes that are (in large measure) gender-neutral,
7
 
although gendered rape statutes are still on the books in some jurisdictions.
8
  
 
 5.  Charlie Savage, U.S. to Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2012. The new FBI definition of rape is: “the penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or 
anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without 
the consent of the victim.”  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces 
Revisions to the Uniform Crime Report’s Definition of Rape, (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/attorney-general-eric-holder-announces-
revisions-to-the-uniform-crime-reports-definition-of-rape. 
 6.  Stephanie Hallett, Definition of Rape Officially Changed, Impacts Men As Well As 
Women, HUFF POST WOMEN, Jan. 6, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephanie-
hallett/definition-of-rape_b_1190633.html.  Accord John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still 
Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and 
Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1083 (2011); See also Elizabeth J. 
Kramer, When Men Are Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 293, 301-302 (1998) (noting that because rape statutes were not gender neutral, rape 
shield laws also failed to protect male victims of sexual assault). 
 7.  See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, The Paradox of Statutory Rape, 
87 IND. L.J. 505, 516 & n.88 (2012) (“today statutory rape statutes are gender-neutral with respect 
to both the class of perpetrators and the class of victims in almost all, if not all, states”); Philip 
N.S. Rumney, In Defence of Gender Neutrality Within Rape, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 481, 
n.33 (2007) (stating that all but five states had adopted gender-neutral rape statutes as of 2007); 
Deborah Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, n.152 (1997) 
(reporting in 1997 that forty-one states had gender-neutral statutes).   
 8.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (defining first-degree rape in 
part as opposite-sex intercourse, providing: “A person commits the crime of rape in the first 
degree if he or she engages in intercourse with a member of the opposite sex by forcible 
compulsion . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law § 3-303 (a)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (defining 
rape in the first degree in part by reference to female anatomy: “a person may not engage in 
vaginal intercourse with another by force”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-71 (West 2011) (defining 
the crime of assault with intent to ravish as “assault with intent to forcibly ravish any female of 
previous chaste character.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(2) (2011) (defining first-degree rape in 
part by reference to a female anatomy that “A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if the 
person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person by force and against the will of the 
other person.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (LexisNexis 2009) (stating that a person commits 
rape when that person “knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with a member of the 
opposite sex” under certain circumstances).  Idaho criminalizes a separate crime of “male rape,” 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6108 (Supp. 2012) (defined as “the penetration, however, slight, of the 
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Nonetheless, until the FBI made this change, male rape victims did not 
count in federal crime statistics.
9
  Even if state law rape definitions 
encompassed male victims, those cases simply were not reported in the 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), which were based on the FBI definition—
the ultimate erasure.
10
  At a minimum, the change in the FBI statistics 
signals important recognition of the existence of male victims, and will 
assist with more accurate reporting.
11
 
The second significant episode of 2012 was resolved as this article was 
being written—it was the Congressional debate regarding the 
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).  In April 
2012, the Senate passed a reauthorization of VAWA providing funding for 
projects to serve LGBT communities and prohibiting VAWA-funded 
services from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity.
12
  Republicans in the House stripped language referring 
specifically to gay and transgender victims from the bill.
13
  Although even 
 
oral or anal opening of another male” in specified circumstances).  See also Courtney O’Donnell, 
Swedish Judge Rules Man Not Guilty of Attempted Rape of Trans Woman Because She Has No 
Vagina, HUFF POST GAY VOICES, July 6, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/courtney-
odonnell/sweden-transgender-rape_b_1647981.html.  
 9.  Savage, supra note 5.   
 10.  Id.   
 11.  But see Brenda V. Smith, Uncomfortable Places, Close Spaces: Female Correctional 
Workers’ Sexual Interactions with Men and Boys in Custody, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1690, 1719 
(2012) (arguing that the new federal definition of rape—”penetration . . . of the vagina or anus 
with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person” – may 
recognize men as rape victims, but still does not encompass women as perpetrators, because of the 
penetration requirement). 
 12.  Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2011-12) 
(the Senate bill would have expanded the definition of “underserved populations” to include 
categories of sexual orientation and gender identity; would have prohibited service providers from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; and would have funded 
expansion of programs for those who have not received services because of their sexual 
orientation and gender identity); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011, Report of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, S. 1925, 112th (2011) (noting that “programs which primarily 
serve gay men . . . have been denied access to [VAWA] funding in the past because they do not 
predominantly address violence against women.”)  See Jonathan Weisman, Senate Votes to 
Reauthorize Domestic Violence Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/04/27/us/politics/senate-votes-to-renew-violence-against-women-act.html.  
 13.  Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, H.R. 4970, 112
th
 Cong. (2012).  
David Grant, House Passes Violence Against Women Act, Grudgingly, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, May 16, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2012/0516/House-
passes-Violence-Against-Women-Act-grudgingly; Jennifer Bendery & Laura Bassett, House 
Passes Violence Against Women Act that Leaves Out LGBT, Immigrant Protections, HUFFINGTON 
POST, May 16, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/16/house-passes-violence-against-
women-act_n_1522524.html; Russell Berman, House, Senate Can’t Agree on Violence Against 
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some House Republicans called on their colleagues to send a more inclusive 
bill to the White House, the 112
th
 Congress ended without the issue being 
resolved.
14
  Shortly before this article went to press, the 113
th
 Congress 
passed an LGBT-inclusive version of VAWA, which President Obama 
signed into law in March 2013.
15
 
The third important development that I’d like to highlight is the 
movement to address sexual violence in prison, including violence against 
men and boys.  This movement has produced the Prison Rape Elimination 
Act of 2003 (PREA),
16
 under which new federal regulations were 
promulgated in May 2012.
17
  These new regulations—the first national 
standards ever to address prison sexual violence
18
—cover men and boys as 
well as women and girls.  They are more protective of female prisoners than 
male inmates in some respects.  Most notably, the new PREA regulations 
ban cross-gender pat searches of adult women but not adult men.
19
  
However, the regulations are largely gender-neutral, and the process that 
produced them involved a lot of public attention to male rape survivors’ 
stories, including from advocacy groups like Just Detention International 
(JDI)
20
 and in the report of the National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission.
21
 
 
Women Act, THE HILL, June 23, 2012, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/234409-house-gop-
senate-dems-cant-agree-on-violence-against-women-act. 
 14.  Jennifer Bendery, Violence Against Women Act: John Boehner, Eric Cantor Pressured 
by Republicans to Act, HUFF POST POLITICS, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2012/12/11/violence-against-women-act-john-boehner-eric-cantor_n_2278549.html. 
 15.  Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 
(2013) (including sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories in the non-
discrimination provision and in the definition of “under-served” populations). See Jackie Calmes, 
Obama Signs Expanded Anti-Violence Law, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2013 (explaining that the new 
version of VAWA extended protections to gay and transgender victims of domestic violence). 
 16.  42 U.S.C.A. § 15606(d)(1), (e)(1) (West 2005). 
 17.  Prison Rape Elimination Act National Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,197 (June 20, 2012) 
(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115).  See David Kaiser & Lovisa Stannow, Prison Rape: Obama’s 
Program to Stop It, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/11/prison-rape-obamas-program-stop-it/.   
 18.  Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Releases Final Rule to Prevent, Detect and 
Respond to Prison Rape, May 17, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-ag-635.html. 
 19.  28 C.F.R. § 115.15 (b) (2012) (providing that, by certain phased-in deadlines, “the 
facility shall not permit cross-gender patdown searches of female inmates, absent exigent 
circumstances.”). 
 20.  See Survivor Testimony, JUST DET. INT’L, http://www.justdetention.org/en/survivor_ 
testimony.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
 21.  NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION 
COMMISSION REPORT (2009).   
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PREA requires state corrections systems to report data on prison sexual 
violence, and this is important for another reason: as Kim Shayo Buchanan 
recently has pointed out, the statistics undermine “conventional gender 
expectations.”
22
  As Buchanan emphasizes, female staff are the alleged 
perpetrators in the majority of male prisoners’ reports of sexual abuse,
23
 and 
women prisoners report more abuse by other female inmates than by 
officers of either gender.
24
 
I submit that these three developments—the change in the FBI 
definition of rape, the debate over VAWA reauthorization, and the 
promulgation of the new PREA regulations—mark 2012 as a year in which 
we moved towards more gender-inclusive conceptions of rape and intimate 
partner violence.  Twenty-five years ago, reformers’ project was to “expose 
fully the sexism of the law,”
25
 and stories of institutionalized misogyny and 
male power dramatized some of the most egregious injustices.  Today 
“governance feminism” has established itself as a prevailing criminal 
justice paradigm,
26
 and feminist law reforms, albeit imperfect and 
incomplete,
27
 have achieved important gains.  Today’s reform efforts both 
 
 22.  Kim S. Buchanan, Engendering Rape, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1630, 1639 (2012).  See also 
Smith, supra note 11 (“One of the most surprising findings of the [BJS] research [after PREA] 
was the widespread involvement of female correctional staff in sexual incidents—both with adult 
and juvenile males in custody.”). 
 23.  Buchanan, supra note 22, at 1638-39 (“In men’s facilities, women generally constitute a 
minority of correctional staff, yet survey respondents consistently report much higher rates of 
sexual victimization by women staff than by fellow inmates.  More than two-thirds of male 
victims of staff sexual abuse say that their perpetrators were exclusively women.”).  Buchanan 
also writes, “in spite of stereotypical expectations, correctional authorities investigating 
allegations of prison rape have often found more ‘substantiated’ cases involving female than male 
staff.”  Id. at 1672.  See also Paul Cook, The Dynamics of Sexual Abuse of Male Juveniles by 
Female Correctional Officers—Myth and Fact, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 1326, 1333 (2012) (writing 
that a 2008-2009 Bureau of Justice Statistics study demonstrated that “[i]n the juvenile setting, the 
males abused by staff were abused almost exclusively by female staff.”). 
 24.  Buchanan, supra note 22, at 1669.  
 25.  Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1090 (1986). 
 26.  JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS 20-22 (2006) (providing a critical description of 
“governance feminism,” stating that “feminism rules.  Governance feminism.  Not only that, it 
wants to rule.  It has a will to power.”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, & Improper 
Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1468 (2003) 
(describing how, despite gains by rape law reformers in trying to abolish marital rape exemptions, 
about twenty-four states still have some kind of marital immunity); See Decker & Baroni, supra 
note 6; Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence A Crime?: Intimate Partner Rape as Allegory, 24 ST. 
JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 564 (2010) (“Continuing unequal treatment of marital rape is 
directly traceable to the historically unequal treatment of women, and married women in 
particular.”).  See also Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law’s Failure to 
Keep Up with Domestic Violence Law, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1819 (2012) (describing how 
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build on and question prior feminist reforms, as we move toward more 
gender-inclusive approaches to these issues. 
It’s no surprise that dominant rape and domestic violence narratives
28
 
have been about men raping and abusing women.  Cases fitting that 
narrative are still the vast majority of reported cases,
29
 although we might 
ask whether that reflects in part a lack of reporting on behalf of male 
victims.
30
  Some have suggested that more victims of same-sex rape and 
intimate partner violence will come forward after Lawrence v. Texas, now 
that there is no longer criminal stigma attached to same-sex sexuality.
31
 
Our dominant narratives are not solely the product of empirical 
realities, however.  Legal theorists in the schools of legal realism, cultural 
studies, cultural cognition, and law and society have long argued that law—
along with legal claims and legal arguments—can “construct” social 
reality.
32
  Law and society scholars Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns 
 
marital rape is still—despite law reforms—not punished as severely as non-marital rape, and 
suggesting that states should implement reforms similar to those enacted in the domestic violence 
arena). 
 28.  Others have written of “dominant narratives” of rape and domestic violence law, making 
different points about race and gender privilege.  See, e.g., Aya Gruber, A “Neo-Feminist” 
Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 583, 608 
(2012) (“[C]riminal law’s embedded narratives and institutional structure make it a poor 
mechanism for dismantling hierarchy and male domination.”); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and 
the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 616 (2009) (quoting Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race 
& Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of 
Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869, 890 (1996)).  
 29.  According to the National Crime Victimization Survey, 1.3 per 1000 women reported 
that they were sexually assaulted in 2010, compared with 0.1 per 1000 men.  JENNIFER L. 
TRUMAN, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009-10 (2011). 
 30.  Capers, supra note 1, at 1273-74 (writing that the reasons for underreporting of rape 
among men include “the taint of homophobia; the fear of appearing weak and hence not 
masculine; and definitional and perceptual issues.”). 
 31.  Id. at 1262 (“[P]rior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas 
invalidating sodomy laws, those who came forward as rape victims risked being prosecuted as 
criminals in many states.”); Pfeifer, supra note 4.  Scholars have made a similar point about 
opposite-sex rape prosecutions following the abandonment or desuetude of laws criminalizing 
consensual heterosexual sex.  See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1 (1998) 
(arguing that traditional rape law doctrine, which may be viewed as misogynist, is better 
understood when we consider that “[w]e inherited the rape crime from a culture in which rape was 
only one of two basic categories of heterosexual offenses.  The other category of offenses 
consisted of consensual sexual intercourse outside of marriage—fornication and adultery—in 
which the man and woman were accomplices.”); Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (describing how “until the mid-twentieth century, marriage played an 
important role in the adjudication, enforcement, and even definition of the crime of seduction.”).   
 32.  Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 948 
(1995).  See Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law & Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 
848-56 (2011) (describing schools of critical legal studies, law and feminism, and law and society, 
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explain, “[w]e come . . . to see ourselves as law sees us.”
33
  As we all know, 
feminist law reform efforts of the latter half of the twentieth century 
focused on male violence against women,
34
 and were rooted in dominance 
feminism, specifically the work of giants such as Catharine MacKinnon.
35
  
It’s not due to numbers alone that we see rape as a tool of male oppression 
of women. 
The “dominant narratives” of rape and domestic violence law have 
been reinforced by the efforts of reformers who brought claims predicated 
on violence against women as a type of sex discrimination.  Linda Kelly has 
written of the example of the 1984 case Thurman v. City of Torrington,
36
 
which I discuss regularly with my Gender & Criminal Law students.  
Tracey Thurman famously sued the town for repeatedly failing to enforce 
orders of protection against her abusive husband.
37
  The claim in Thurman 
was crafted as a gender discrimination claim, alleging that the City had 
failed to protect “women who have complained of being abused by their 
husbands . . . .”
38
  Accordingly, Ms. Thurman’s equal protection claim 
received an intermediate level of scrutiny.
39
  As Professor Kelly has argued, 
although this equal protection argument in Thurman garnered a more 
 
and how these schools describe “law as constitutive of culture and social relations.”).  Mautner 
quotes Pierre Bourieu and Richard Terdiman: “law is the quintessential form of the symbolic 
power of naming that creates the thing named . . . .”  Id. at 850 (quoting Pierre Bourdieu & 
Richard Terdiman, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS 
L.J. 805, 838 (1987)).  See also Dan Kahan, Culture, Cognition and Consent: Who Perceives 
What, and Why, in Acquaintance Rape Cases, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 729, 799 (2010) (“The only 
certain effect of any sort of reform is expressive.  Laws have meanings as well as consequences.”). 
 33.  Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, The Cultural Lives of Law, in AUSTIN SARAT & 
THOMAS R. KEARNS, ED. LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE (1998). 
 34.  Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
 35.  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 635, 650-51 (1983) (“To be rapable, 
a position which is social not biological, defines what a woman is.”).  See also Linda Kelly, 
Disabusing the Definition of Domestic Abuse: How Women Batter Men and the Role of the 
Feminist State, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 791, 817-18 (2003) (discussing the role of feminist theory, 
and in particular the work of Catharine MacKinnon, in shaping our dominant understanding of 
domestic violence). 
 36.  Kelly, supra note 35, at 832-36 (discussing Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 
1521 (D. Conn. 1984)). 
 37.  Kelly, supra note 35, at 832 (“The critical 1984 decision in Thurman v. City of 
Torrington set the tone, adding the judicial branch to the increasingly pervasive number of 
institutions that ignore female violence.”). 
 38.  595 F. Supp. at 1527. 
 39.  Id. 
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plaintiff-friendly legal standard, it also wholly equated domestic violence 
with men’s abuse of women.
40
 
Legal claims casting sexual and intimate partner violence as sex 
discrimination against women continue to appear in domestic violence 
advocacy,
41
 as well as in Title IX proceedings
42
 and international human 
rights law,
43
 eclipsing victimization of men.  Although the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA)
44
 is gender neutral in its language, its title 
 
 40.  Kelly, supra note 35, at 832-36 (2003) (Professor Kelly criticizes the equal protection 
rationale of Thurman, writing that, in employing a “gender-related” equal protection standard, the 
court “fail[ed] to leave room for the possibility of female violence,” and argues that, “[b]y 
tailoring the standard exclusively to battered women, the courts have further reinforced the belief 
that only women can be the victims of domestic violence.”).  See also Ryan Elias Newby, Evil 
Women and Innocent Victims: The Effect of Gender on California Sentences for Domestic 
Homicide, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 113 (2011) (comparing sentences for men and women 
convicted of spousal homicide in California and concluding that women were more often subject 
to weapons enhancements, but also more likely to be convicted of lesser included offenses if they 
could demonstrate their spouse’s prior history of violence). 
 41.  See Erica Franklin, When Domestic Violence and Sex-Based Discrimination Collide: 
Civil Rights Approaches to Combating Domestic Violence and its Aftermath, 4 DEPAUL J. for 
Social Justice 335 (2011) (advocating using claims of sex-based discrimination under the equal 
protection clause, Title VII, and the Fair Housing Act to help female survivors of heterosexual 
domestic violence, although recognizing that intimate partner violence occurs in same-sex 
relationships as well, and that men can be victims). The author explains, “with some exceptions, 
the civil rights challenges discussed in this Comment apply by their very nature only to female 
survivors of domestic violence—an inevitable limitation of the approach for which this Comment 
advocates.”  Id. at 339.  See also Niji Jain, Engendering Fairness in Domestic Violence Arrests: 
Improving Police Accountability Through the Equal Protection Clause, 60 EMORY L.J. 1011, 
1040 (2011) (developing an equal protection argument to address police non-enforcement of 
restraining orders by targeting police stereotypes about women). 
 42.  See, e.g., Wendy Murphy, Using Title IX’s “Prompt and Equitable” Hearing 
Requirement to Force Schools to Provide Fair Judicial Proceedings to Redress Sexual Assault on 
Campus, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1007, 1014 (2006) (“Women victims of serious or pervasive 
sexual and gender harassment had to jump through . . . burdensome hurdles . . . while students 
reporting even a single verbal slur regarding their race or sexual orientation received immediate 
and meaningful intervention.”); see also Erin Buzuvis, Court Dismisses Claims in Bully-Suicide 
Case, Title IX Blog (Jan. 9, 2012, 12:04 PM),  http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2012/01/court-
dismisses-claims-in-bully-suicide.html (discussing the decision, Estate of Carmichael v. 
Galbraith,  No. 3:11–CV–0622–D, 2012 WL 13568 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2012), in which the court 
rejected claims by the survivors of a teen who committed suicide after being bullied, concluding 
that the decedent had not been targeted “because of sex,” as required by Title IX, despite his 
tormentors’ use of homophobic slurs such as “fag, queer, homo, and douche.”). 
 43.  See Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What’s Wrong With Women’s Rights, 20 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98, 107 (2011) (“The drafters of CEDAW sought to situate women’s 
rights as a preeminent international concern.  Women throughout the world confronted sexist 
institutions, and the drafters’ goals centered on utilizing international human rights law to 
ameliorate these harms.”) (footnote omitted). 
 44.  Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in 
42 U.S.C. §§ 13981-14045 (2006)). 
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demonstrates its animating focus.
45
  Professor Sally Goldfarb writes that the 
bill’s sponsors were “deeply immersed in an awareness that violence 
against women is one of the principal ways in which male dominance and 
female subordination are expressed and perpetuated.”
46
  It is for this reason 
that Professor Capers has described VAWA as an effort to “gender 
crime.”
47
 
These dominant, gendered narratives of rape and domestic violence 
have imposed certain costs.  Some argue that they have reinforced the 
notion that to be raped or battered is, by definition, a woman’s experience,
48
 
contributing to male survivors’ feelings of shame and isolation.
49
  Others 
have noted these stories obscure intimate partner violence in LGBT 
relationships.
50
 
An increasing number of theorists have proposed different ways of 
conceptualizing intimate violence.  Angela Harris and Kim Buchanan have 
employed the term “gender violence,” emphasizing that violent acts affirm 
 
 45. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Viewing the Violence Against Women Act Through the Lenses of 
Feminist Legal Theory, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 198, 201 (2010) (“Despite the emphasis on 
violence against women in the statute’s title and legislative history, the civil rights section 
furnished a claim to anyone, male or female, who was a victim of a crime of violence motivated 
by gender.”). 
 46.  Id. at 200. 
 47.  Capers, supra note 1, at 1295. 
 48.  See Smith, supra note 11, at 1719 (“The law reinforces the narrative that women can 
only be passive victims of rape by virtue of their gender.”); cf. MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE ON 
MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 8-9 (1997) (“The general belief persists 
that either men cannot be raped, or if they are, so few men are raped that it becomes a freak 
occurrence.”). 
 49.  Scarce, supra note 48, at 9-10 (“[W]hen men are raped by other men, society tends to 
silence and erase them rather than acknowledge the vulnerability of masculinity and manhood.”); 
Smith, supra note 11, at 1723 (“In female-on-male sexual assault cases, men are disbelieved, 
mocked, or thought to have initiated, encouraged, or enjoyed the assault in some manner.  This 
contributes to men’s reluctance to report forced or coerced sex, especially by women.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 50.  Commentators mark the 1983 Lesbian Task Force of the National Coalition of Domestic 
Violence as the first public, national recognition of the problem of battering in LGBT 
relationships.  Pamela M. Jablow, Note, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting Battered 
Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legislation, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2000).  
Beginning in the 1990s, increasing numbers of legal commentators wrote about abuse in same sex 
relationships, the lack of legal protections for gays and lesbians, and the need for training of law 
enforcement personnel.  See Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law & 
Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567, 568 (1990); Nancy E. Murphy, Note, 
Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 
335, 339 (1995); Kathleen Finley Duthu, Perspective, Why Doesn’t Anyone Talk About Gay & 
Lesbian Domestic Violence, 18 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 23, 24 (1996); Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That 
Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in 
Massachusetts, 28 N. ENG. L. REV. 273, 274-275 (1993). 
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the offender’s normative masculinity, and can be perpetrated on men as 
well as women.
51
  Others, most famously Janet Halley, have called for the 
left to “take a break from feminism,”
52
 in order to work outside what Halley 
describes as an “M>F” anti-subordination framework.
53
  Halley asks 
whether feminism has endowed women with the ability to “wield[] the 
moral code of good sex,” and whether this moralism is in fact “bad for 
women.”
54
 
By contrast, other commentators have reaffirmed that they are 
intentionally working from a “violence against women” perspective, and 
argue that domestic violence remains rooted primarily in male dominance.
55
  
Some assert that men are trying to “co-opt” the label of “victim.”
56
 
 
 51.  Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 
780 (2000) (using the term “gender violence” to describe “violent acts committed by men  . . . [as 
a means of] demonstrating the perpetrator’s manhood,” and arguing that “men as well as women 
may be its victims.”); Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a 
Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 17-18 (2011); Kim S. Buchanan, Our Prisons, 
Ourselves: Race, Gender & the Rule of Law, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 37 (2010) (explaining 
that in both prison and the free world, men “use same-sex sexual abuse and harassment to reaffirm 
that they are straight and manly and that their victims deserve abuse and contempt for being 
effeminate or gay”); Kim S. Buchanan, E-race-ing Gender: The Racial Construction of Prison 
Rape, in MULTIDIMENSIONAL MASCULINITIES AND LAW: FEMINIST AND CRITICAL RACE 
APPROACHES 187, 188-89 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012); Christopher N. 
Kendall, Gay Male Pornography and Sexual Violence: A Sex Equality Perspective on Gay Male 
Rape and Partner Abuse, 49 MCGILL L.J. 877, 918 (2004) (arguing that gay male pornography 
can reinforce notions of masculinity that rely on violence and that “[g]ay men who batter and 
abuse their partners have specific ideas about masculinity and what it means to be ‘male.’”). 
 52.  HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 26, at 283; Janet Halley, writing sub nom Ian 
Halley, Queer Theory by Men, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE 
ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 9, 9 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 
2009); see also Marc Spindelman, Feminism Without Feminism, 9 ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP: LEGAL FEMINISM NOW, ARTICLE 8 (2011), available at http://www.bepress.com/ 
ils/vol9/iss2/art8. 
 53.  Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 52, at 10 (“[T]o be a feminism in the United 
States today, a position must posit some kind of subordination as between M and F.”). 
 54.  HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 26, at 356 (Halley asks us to reimagine a divorce 
case in which the wife has alleged coerced bondage by the husband, asking: “Can feminism read 
the case as male subordination and female domination—and still as bad for women?”). 
 55.  See Kathleen J. Ferraro, Woman Battering: More Than A Family Problem, in WOMEN, 
CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 135, 136-37 (Claire M. Renzetti & Lynne Goodstein eds., 2009) 
(“The violence against women perspective insists that patriarchy, sexism, and gender inequality 
are the fundamental conditions under which violence against female partners develops. . . . This 
chapter is written from the violence against women perspective and uses the term ‘woman 
battering.’”); see also Hodges, supra note 4, at 331 nn.112-13 (quoting and discussing Demie 
Kurz, Violence Against Women or Family Violence? Current Debates and Future Directions, in 
GENDER VIOLENCE: INTER-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 443, 447 (Laura L. O’Toole et al. eds., 
1997); MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 334 (3d ed. 2013) 
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Against the backdrop of this debate, the prison anti-sexual violence 
movement may provide a model of a more gender-inclusive approach to 
reform.  The movement that produced the Prison Rape Elimination Act 
(“PREA”) was led in part by male survivors,
57
 and informed from the start 
by awareness of male rape victims.
58
  Passage of the initial PREA 
legislation in 2003 was not as much a mainstream gay rights movement 
victory as it was the product of a counter-intuitive alliance including 
evangelical Christian elements.
59
  However, the final Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) regulations promulgated under the statute in 2012 were shaped by 
contributions from free-world LGBT advocacy groups,
60
 which included 
many ground-breaking provisions affecting LGBT prisoners.
61
 
The movement that produced PREA is remarkable among law reform 
movements for its focus on male rape survivors.  This is illustrated by the 
rape survivors’ testimony on the web site for Just Detention International 
(“JDI” formerly STOP Prisoner Rape) one of the organizations that was 
 
(noting that “[s]ome feminists prefer to use the term ‘woman abuse’ or ‘male battering of women’ 
to highlight the fact that women are most often the victims of the violence.”). 
 56.  Patricia Novotny, Rape Victims in the (Gender) Neutral Zones: The Assimilation of 
Resistance, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 743, 745, 750 (2003) (arguing that “male co-optation of 
the victim category” may represent a “backlash” against feminist law reform). 
 57.  See Valerie Jenness & Michael Smyth, The Passage and Implementation of the Prison 
Rape Elimination Act: Legal Endogeneity and the Uncertain Road From Symbolic Law to 
Instrumental Effects, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 489, 494, 501 (2011) (describing multiple 
constituencies that contributed to the movement to eliminate prison rape, including the 
organization Stop Prisoner Rape, and explaining the importance of the testimonials of prison rape 
survivors). 
 58.  See Capers, supra note 1, at 1267 (finding that systemic efforts to gather data on male 
rape resulted from Congress’ passage of the “mostly hortatory” PREA) (quoting Alice Ristroph, 
Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 175 (2006)); see also Terry A. Kupers, 
M.D., M.S.P., The Role of Misogyny and Homophobia in Prison Sexual Abuse, 18 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 108-109 (2010). 
 59.  Jenness & Smyth, supra note 57, at 503 (describing the role of Prison Fellowship 
Ministries in the passage of PREA and explaining its involvement in part based on the fact that 
“the modern evangelical sector has long been committed to controlling sexual behavior and 
sexuality—especially when it involves same-sex participants.”). 
 60.  Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 365-66 (2009) 
(describing contributions of LGBT advocacy groups to the regulations proposed to the DOJ by the 
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission).  
 61.  National Standards To Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, Final Rule, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 119, 37109-110 (June 20, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 115), available at 
http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/2012-12427.pdf  (describing 
provisions affecting LGBT inmates and Gender Non-Conforming Inmates, including training for 
staff, no searches permitted solely to determine genital status; no segregated units for LGBT 
inmates without a consent decree, judgment, or settlement; requirement that housing for 
transgender prisoners be determined on a case-by-case basis). 
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instrumental in getting PREA enacted.
62
  JDI features stories from men and 
women, including gay and transgender prisoners.  One JDI campaign on 
social media features two pictures of the same young man.  In the first 
photo, he is wearing street clothes and the caption reads, “would you joke 
around about this man being raped?”  In the second, he appears in a prison 
uniform, and the caption reads, “how about now?”
63
 
The more gender-inclusive nature of the movement to end prison 
sexual violence may be attributable in large part to the demographics of the 
incarcerated population,
64
 but also may be reinforced by the nature of 
available legal claims.  Although advocates for women prisoners and for 
male victims of prison rape often worked separately due to the state-
enforced sex segregation of corrections institutions, the Eighth Amendment 
provides a single legal standard that applies to all sentenced prisoners.
65
  
Unlike equal protection or statutory sex discrimination provisions, the 
Eighth Amendment is not dependent on protected categories or 
comparators.
66
  Nor is there any ambiguity about whether abuse of gay or 
transgender prisoners is covered under the Eighth Amendment.
67
  In fact, 
the prevailing Eighth Amendment standard for failure to protect cases was 
set in the case of a transgender woman housed in a male facility in Farmer 
v. Brennan.
68
  The Farmer standard may be very difficult to meet,
69
 but it 
does not require a demonstration of sex discrimination. 
This does not mean that courts are even-handed in their application of 
legal standards to prisoners’ cases.  Some are less receptive to men’s claims 
of sexual abuse than to similar claims by women prisoners,
70
 grounding 
 
 62.  Survivor Testimony, JUST DET. INT’L, http://www.justdetention.org/en/survivor_ 
testimony.aspx (last visited March 21, 2013). 
 63.  Attitudes, JUST DET. INT’L, http://www.justdetention.org/en/attitudes.aspx (last visited 
March 21, 2013). 
 64.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that in 2011, there were 1,487,393 people in 
corrections facilities designated for men, under state or federal authority, and 111,387 people in 
facilities designated for women.  See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SOBOL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2011, 2 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf. 
 65.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 66.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 829-30, 837. 
 69.  See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions & the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 881, 892 (2009) (criticizing the Farmer standard because it “holds officers liable only for 
those risks they happen to notice . . . .”). 
 70.  See Nancy Levit, Male Prisoners: Privacy, Suffering, and the Legal Construction of 
Masculinity, in PRISON MASCULINITIES 93, 93 (Don Sabo et al. eds., 2001). 
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their Eighth Amendment analysis in evidence of women prisoners’ asserted 
heightened vulnerabilities.
71
  A number of decisions have rejected due 
process or privacy challenges to female officers’ supervision of male 
prisoners.
72
  One opinion even doubted whether sexual abuse of male 
prisoners constituted a “physical injury” within the meaning of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), thereby precluding survivors from 
seeking money damages.
73
 
Moreover, as Kim Buchanan has forcefully pointed out, anti-prison 
sexual violence commentators and advocates themselves are not immune 
from the power of our dominant, gendered rape narratives, sometimes 
perpetuating these narratives even when they are not supported by 
statistics.
74
  Buchanan argues that, despite the fact that data generated by 
PREA directly counters some of our dominant narratives about the 
gendered dynamics of rape, these notions remain resistant to change.
75
  
Indeed, some provisions of the new PREA regulations—most notably the 
provisions regarding cross-gender pat searches—were limited to women 
prisoners and juveniles.
76
 The DOJ stated that it adopted different cross-
 
 71.  See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that 
random, suspicionless, clothed-body pat searches of female prisoners by male guards violated the 
Eighth Amendment, in part based on factual findings by the district court “that physical, 
emotional and psychological differences between men and women ‘may well cause women, and 
especially physically and sexually abused women, to react differently to searches of this type than 
would male inmates subjected to similar searches by women.’”). 
 72.  See Levit, supra note 70, at 93.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150-151
 
(7th 
Cir. 1995) (rejecting a male pretrial detainee’s Fourth Amendment and due process challenges to 
observation of naked male prisoners by women officers). 
 73.  Hancock v. Payne, No. 1:03-CV-671, 2006 WL 21751, *1, 3* (S.D. Miss. Jan 4, 2006).  
See Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and 
Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PENN. J. CON. L. 139, 
143-47 (2008) (discussing the PLRA physical injury requirement and the Hancock case). 
 74.  Buchanan, supra note 22, at 1678 (noting that, despite the BJS statistics, “official and 
academic commentators persist in characterizing nonforcible staff-on-inmate sex as ‘romantic’ or 
harmless.”). 
 75.  Id. at 1673 (“[W]hen researchers encounter surprising, counter-stereotypical results, their 
explanations reveal interpretive tendencies that reconcile those results with stereotypical 
expectations.”).  Buchanan concludes her article: “The gaps and elisions of prison rape discourse 
reveal the grip of unexamined gender and racial stereotypes on our understanding of prison rape 
and of sexual abuse more generally.  Prison realities demonstrate that, at least in some 
circumstances, women may be more sexually aggressive, and men more sexually vulnerable, than 
conventional gender expectations would predict.”  Id. at 1688.  See also Smith, supra note 11, at 
1692 (“This Article seeks first and foremost to explain why the statistical evidence of abuse of 
men and boys in custodial settings surprises reformers and disrupts perceived gender norms, and 
to explain why female correctional workers have sex with men and boys in custody.”). 
 76.  28 C.F.R. § 115.15 (b) (2012) (providing that, by certain phased-in deadlines, “the 
facility shall not permit cross-gender pat-down searches of female inmates, absent exigent 
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gender pat search policies for women because corrections officials feared 
charges of employment discrimination if they limited female officers’ 
duties in male facilities, and because of high reported rates of past abuse by 
women prisoners.
77
  Certainly, these justifications can and will be subject to 
continued debate. 
Despite the continued influence of gendered expectations, the anti-
prison sexual violence movement has been shaped by male rape survivors 
to a much greater extent than free-world anti-violence movements.  The 
more gender-inclusive approach of the movement that produced PREA may 
be a precursor to further free-world trends, particularly more awareness of 
LGBT victims. 
We might ask what larger shifts are driving this transition to more 
gender-inclusive anti-violence movements.  Certainly, a weakening of 
societal homophobia and growing LGBT rights movements are key 
components of the new environment.
78
  Another powerful force might be 
increased public attention to abuse of boys in scandals involving institutions 
like Penn State,
79
 the Horace Mann School,
80
 and the Catholic Church.
81
 
A common denominator to many of these developments, however, is 
our changing conception of gender, and particularly a growing focus on the 
construction of masculinities.
82
  Masculinities scholars such as Frank Rudy 
Cooper and Jackson Katz have contributed to an increasing understanding 
that gender is a “performance”;
83
 that male “gender violence” can victimize 
 
circumstances.”). 28 C.F.R. § 115.315 (2012) (barring cross-gender pat-down, strip, and visual 
body cavity searches of juveniles except in exigent circumstances). 
 77.  National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 
37,106, 37,133 (June 20, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115) (responding to comments on 
cross-gender pat-down searches). 
 78.  See LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION 324 (2012) 
(arguing that the gay rights movement has largely met its goals). 
 79.  Tim Rohan, Sandusky Gets 30 to 60 years for Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/sports/ncaafootball/penn-state-sandusky-is-sentenced-in-sex-
abuse-case.html?_r=0. 
 80.  Amos Kamil, Prep-School Predators: The Horace Mann School’s Secret History of 
Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/magazine/the-
horace-mann-schools-secret-history-of-sexual-abuse.html?pagewanted=all. 
 81.  Laurie Goodstein & Erik Eckholm, Church Battles Efforts to Ease Sex Abuse Suits, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/us/sex-abuse-statutes-of-limitation-
stir-battle.html?pagewanted=all. 
 82.  See Nancy E. Dowd et al., Feminist Legal Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, in 
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 29 (Frank Rudy Cooper & 
Ann C. McGinley, eds., 2012). 
 83.  See Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops & 
Police Training, 18 COL. J. GENDER & L. 671, 684 (2009) (writing that “the field of masculinities 
studies presumes that men’s behavior is socially constructed” and that “our performances of our 
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other men;
84
 and that men’s socially-constructed gender roles often mask 
men’s very real vulnerabilities.
85
  Counter-intuitively, our attention to how 
male gender roles contribute to male violence also may help us to conceive 
of men as victims in certain contexts.
86
 
An increasingly flexible conception of gender is not just an academic 
trend, but a consciousness that increasingly informs popular and youth 
culture—what the New York Times recently described as “Generation 
LGBTQIA.”
87
  This attitudinal shift has encompassed a more frank 
acknowledgment of the possibility of male victimization.  For example, the 
Columbia University “Take Back the Night” march, which previously had a 
female-only space, went fully “gender-neutral” in 2012.
88
  One student 
organizer explained, “Men can be survivors as well and it’s good to remind 
everyone of that.”
89
 
A question that others have posed and that bears further attention is 
how anti-violence movements can adopt a more inclusive stance toward 
male and same-sex victims, without producing yet more over-incarceration 
of poor communities and communities of color.
90
  Feminist efforts to 
reform rape and domestic violence law have been criticized by some for 
 
gender constitute the very gender they are said to express.”); Video: Jackson Katz, Tough Guise: 
Violence, Media & the Crisis in Masculinity (Susan Ericsson, Sanjay Talreja 2006) (on file with 
author). 
 84.  Harris, supra note 51, at 780. 
 85.  Katz, supra note 83. 
 86.  Dowd et al., supra note 82, at 29 (explaining that “some of that structuring [of 
masculinity] creates a price, not a privilege; it creates harm, not benefit.”). 
 87.  Michael Schulman, Generation LGBTQIA, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/fashion/generation-lgbtqia.html?pagewanted=all. 
 88.  Abby Abrams Take Back the Night March Goes Gender-Neutral, COLUMBIA 
SPECTATOR, March 29, 2012, http://www.columbiaspectator.com/2012/03/29/take-back-night-
march-goes-gender-neutral. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to “Straighten Out” Criminal 
Law: What Might Happen When Queer Theory & Practice Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional 
Response to Domestic Violence, 13 S.CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 86 (2003) (advocating 
responses to same-sex domestic violence that are not based solely on criminal law, and arguing 
that “the better and more productive responses to same-sex domestic violence, which are primarily 
the product of social service agencies and community-based organizations, are underpinned by 
queer theory’s concepts of sexuality in general . . . .”).  See also URVASHI VAID, IRRESISTIBLE 
REVOLUTION: CONFRONTING RACE, CLASS AND THE ASSUMPTIONS OF LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER POLITICS 63 (2012) (Arguing that “reducing the over-
criminalization of certain communities, sentencing reform, support for better treatment of 
prisoners, working for an end to rape inside prison affect many LGBT people, and 
disproportionately affect people of color.”).  
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relying too much on state power and criminal punishment,
91
 a particular 
concern in an era of unprecedented U.S. incarceration
92
 and a persistently 
racially biased criminal punishment system.
93
  An increasing number of 
commentators have called for anti-violence efforts that are more sensitive to 
survivors’ autonomy,
94
 and rely less on our bloated incarceration system.
95
  
These important questions are beyond the scope of this brief symposium 
contribution. 
In this piece, I have highlighted some recent markers of our transition 
to a more gender-inclusive notion of sexual assault and intimate partner 
violence.  The change to a more gender-inclusive approach will have many 
implications for criminal justice policy and institutions, some of which 
Professor Kelly Strader and I discussed in a book review that appeared last 
year.
96
  One critical project is to ensure that courts and prosecutors adopt 
competent and fair practices in cases involving same-sex intimate partner 
and sexual violence.
97
  In future articles, I hope to look more closely at 
various aspects of how these issues play out in our criminal prosecution 
system.  For today, let’s remember 2012 as a moment of transition in 
movements against violence, now [including but not limited to] violence 
against women. 
 
 91.  See Gruber, supra note 28, at 653 (arguing that “feminists should disengage from rape 
reforms that strengthen the penal state”); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 741, 763 (2007) (describing “the domestic violence reform movement’s transformation from 
a grassroots progressive movement to an ally of conservative criminology.”); Emily J. Sack, 
Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1675. 
 92.  See Hope Metcalf, Foreword: When Words Fail: Confronting the Carceral State, 38 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1209, 1209 (2012) (discussing ramifications of the fact that 1 in 100 
Americans is incarcerated, roughly 2.5 million people on any given day). 
 93.  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 4 
(2010).   
 94.  See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 28, at 598 (calling for neo-feminist critiques of feminist law 
reform efforts that “reject gender-crime law reform on the particular ground that it actually 
disserves individual women and is damaging to the greater goals of feminism.”); LEIGH 
GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & THE LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (2011) 
(noting that “[t]he law is simply not a one size fits all situation.”); Leigh Goodmark, Reframing 
Domestic Violence Law & Policy: An Anti-Essentialist Proposal, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39 
(2009); Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory 
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